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TESTING MACEDONIA 1 
ECMI Brief #4, May 2001 
Farimah Daftary2 
 
Introduction: The 2001 Crisis 
In late February 2001, violence broke out in the village of Tanusevci, located on the 
northern border with Kosovo (and which served as a KLA base in 1999).  This was not a 
chance incident but rather a deliberate attempt to bring violence to Macedonia by the so-
called "National Liberation Army" (NLA).  When fig ti g between the NLA and the 
Macedonian army spread the following month to Tetovo—the sec nd largest city in the 
country located in the West with a clear ethnic Albanian majority—the wors  fears of the 
international community concerning a new Balkan war seemed to be confirmed. The 
foreign media was quick to seize on a story, using extreme terms such as 'Balkan Ulster',3 
much to the frustration of the majority population concerned about the image of their 
country known thus far as an 'Oasis of Peace'. On 21 March, the Macedonian 
government4 gave the NLA a 24-hour deadline to lay down arms or to leave the country. 
A full-scale military offensive launched on 25 March by the Macedonian army, aided by 
equipment sent in by foreign countries, succeeded in pushing the NLA fi hters into 
Kosovo.  This proved to be a short-lived victory.  On 28 April, eight Macedonian soldiers 
and police officers were killed in an ambush while patrolling the border near Tetovo. A 
few days later, two more soldiers were killed, this time near Kumanovo in the north. The 
NLA, which claimed to have acted in self-defence, seemed to have succeeded in 
unleashing acts of inter-ethnic violence: the killings provoked a wave of vengeance 
attacks on 30 April and 1 May on stores owned by ethnic Albanians in the southern city 
                                                    
1 The term "Macedonia" is used  for practical reasons to denote this country, which was recognised by the 
international community as "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". The official name in use in the  
country itself is "Republic of Macedonia". 
2 The author is a Research Associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, Germany. 
The author wishes to thank Prof. Dr. Stefan Troebst, Professor of East Central European Cultural Studies, 
University of Leipzig, and Florian Bieber, ECMI Regional Representative for Bosnia, for their helpful 
comments. 
3 Tom Walker, "NATO Troops caught in a Balkan Ulster," The Sunday Times, 18 March 2001. 
4 The current government, formed after the 1998 parliamentary elections, is a coalition between the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-
DPMNE) of Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski, the small Liberal Party (LP) and the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (DPA). 
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of Bitola (from which four of the victims originated). Further incidents were reported in 
other ethnically mixed cities, including the capital Skopje. The government reacted by 
imposing a curfew in Kumanovo, Bitola and Tetovo, star ed shelling NLA positions on 
the border near Kumanovo and Tetovo and was considering declaring a state of war on 8 
May to have greater means of fighting back the NLA.  
 
The position of the Macedonian government is that the NLA is a terrorist organization,5 
that it is exogenous to Macedonia, and that this is therefore an imported crisis.  Indeed, 
this new group which made its first official appearance in January 2001, has been linked 
to two militant organizations in neighbouring Kosovo—the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and a splinter group, the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac 
(Ushtria Çlirimtare e Preshevës Medvegjës dhe Bujanocit) (UÇPMB).6 However, the 
NLA also includes ethnic Albanians from Macedonia (who either previously fought with 
the KLA or have taken up arms recently to fight with the NLA).7 
 
Impact on Inter-Ethnic Relations 
In the aftermath of the crisis, inter-ethnic relations in the country have become even more 
tense, a situation which has been aggravated by incidents of hate speech in the local 
media (especially in the state-owned print media).8 On 29 April, the evening news in 
                                                    
5 The NLA is referred to as a terrorist organisation in the US State Department's Annual Report on Patterns 
of Global Terrorism for 2000 (released in April 2001) (see http://www.state.gov/s/ct rls/pgtrpt/2000/). 
6 The Macedonian NLA and the Kosovar KLA have the same abbreviation in Albanian: UÇK (which 
stands for Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare in the case of the NLA and Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës in the 
case of the KLA). For more on these various movements and inter-linkages, see Stefan Troebst, "Gross-
Kosovo" (Greater Kosovo), paper given at the conference "Neuordnung von Staat und Nation in 
Jugoslawien" (Reformation of State and Nation in Yugoslavia) of the Task Force Jugoslawien of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and the German Foreign Office, Berlin, 2 May 2001. 
7 The Macedonian government maintains that the NLA is composed mainly of KLA fighters from Kosovo 
and that it enjoys little support among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia (although it admits that the NLA 
includes some ethnic Albanians from Macedonia who left for Kosovo to fight with the KLA and have now 
joined the NLA). The NLA fighters were pushed into Macedonia by the Yugoslav army when it sought to 
regain control of southern Serbia and the border region, in cooperation with international forces. The 
Macedonian government rejects reports that local ethnic Albanians from Macedonia have taken up arms to 
fight with the NLA while foreign observers and some ethnic Albanians in Macedonia maintain that the 
NLA now enjoys the support of many ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. The NLA itself claims that about 
80% of its fighters are from Macedonia.  
8 See Fabian Schmidt, "Hate Speech Poisons the Atmosphere", RFE/RL Balkan Report 5:23, 27 March 
2001 (at: http://www.rferl.org/balkan-report/2001/03/23-270301.html). For a background on inter-ethnic 
relations, see Daftary, Farimah, "Inter-Ethnic Relations in the 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' 
and the Role of the Local NGO Sector in Promoting Inter-Ethnic Communication," Report on a Fact-
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Albanian on Macedonian TV and radio was suspended, allegedly because it was acting 
against state interests and as a factor of disintegration.9 Accord ng to the Helsinki 
Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia (MHC),10 the recent events 
have resulted in the (ethnic) Macedonian population's increased sensitivity to the 
Albanian issue, resulting in overreactions, increased mistrust, and fear of ecessionism.  
 
If one wishes to counter the theory that conflict in Macedonia was inevitable, then why, 
one might ask, did a violent conflict eventually take place in Macedonia, and why now? 
One theory is that the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia has b c me increasingly 
frustrated with the weakness of its political leaders who are not effectively representing 
their interests and concerns.11 The commanders of the NLA, sidelined from politics in 
Kosovo,12 might have calculated that this would be an opportu e moment to capitalise on 
this dissatisfaction to try and open a front in Macedonia. This is a sort of delayed version 
of the "spillover theory", according to which inter-et nic civil war would spill over into 
Macedonia from Kosovo (after all, war did not break out in Macedonia as a result of the 
Kosovo conflict nor of the ensuing wave of refugees in 1999). What has however 
happened has been a decision by an ethnic Albanian paramilitary organisation with roots 
                                                                                                                                              
Finding Visit, 12-19 June 2000 (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 12 July 2000) (at: 
http://www.ecmi.de/publications/jemie/data/macedonia.html). 
9 The Albanian-language journalists insist that the general manager of Macedonian Radio and Television 
has been deliberately misinformed regarding the content of the Albanian-language news broadcast by those 
responsible for translating it into Macedonian (see daily briefing on the Macedonian crisis of 3 May 2001 
by the Eurobalkan Institute, at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/2157). 
10 Cf. "Joint Statement by he Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia and the 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights," UN Commission for Human Rights, 57th Session, 
Item 14, Specific Groups and Individuals, (b) Minorities, Geneva, 12 April 2001 (at: 
http://racoon.riga.lv/minelres/archive/04202001-10:09:35-41.html).  
11 There are two ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia: the DPA, which has been a member of the 
governing coalition since 1998, and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), which was in government 
until 1998 and has become the more radical of the two since it has been in opposition; both parties are 
represented in Parliament. The DPA and PDP were joined in March 2001 by a third, rival ethnic Albanian 
party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which advocates federalisation of the country 
12 According to Tim Judah, many of the membrs of the Popular Movement for Kosovo (LPK), a small 
party which was instrumental in setting up the KLA, were not Kosovar but Macedonian Albanians. While 
some opted for politics at the end of the war in Kosovo, others did not. These are people whom he calls "the 
losers of Kosovo politics" who have been agitating to begin a conflict in Macedonia. See Tim Judah, "A 
Greater Albania?", The New York Review of Books 48:8, 17 May 2001, pp. 35-37; see also Tim Judah, 
Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). Stefan Troebst has published a 
similar analysis in: Troebst, Stefan, "'Großalbanien', ein Trugbild. Die Teilgesellschaften in den 
verschiedenen Staaten haben sich ganz unterschiedlich entwickelt," Fra kfurt r Allgemeine Zeitung no. 
248, 25 October 2000, p.15 ( see also footnote 17).    
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in both Kosovo and Macedonia to deliberately p ovoke clashes with the Macedonian 
army in the hope that this will in turn spark a conflict between the Macedonian authorities 
and the local Albanian minority.13 Why then did the NLA not act already in 1999, when 
Macedonia was struggling to deal with the nflux of refugees and ethnic tensions were 
running high ? Explanation for the actual timing of the events of 2001 must be sought in a 
combination of factors, e.g. the influence of ethnic Albanian decision-makers n Kosovo, 
the tightening of control over the border region by KFOR and Yugoslav forces, as well as 
incursions by the Macedonian special forces into the border town of Tanusevci in March 
2001. Incidents on the Kosovo-Macedonian border already in 2000 indicate that 
preparations for the NLA offensives in 2001 might have already begun one year earlier.   
 
Another theory saw the growing inter-ethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and 
ethnic Albanians following Macedonian independence as a sign of a coming clash 
between the two groups. It seems however that, notwithstanding the diversity of interests 
within the ethnic Albanian community and the shared feeling of discrimination and 
second class status, a majority of its members wishes to continue living as citizens of the 
Republic of Macedonia for the political, economic and other advantages of  being 
governed by Skopje have until now outweighed the numerous disadvantages of the risks 
of trying to change the territorial status quo.14  
 
Regional Stability and the Role of the International Community 
International observers had feared that, following the parliamentary elections of 22 April, 
Montenegro would secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), triggering 
renewed violence not only in Kosovo but also in Macedonia by the NLA seeking to put 
on the international agenda the question of the status of those parts of Western 
                                                    
13 There were two variants of the spillover scenario: the first one assumed that the Western and Northern 
portions of Macedonia would become the theatre of military operations by either the Albanian army or by 
paramilitary formations of Macedonian Albanians (or both) supporting Albanian insurgents in Kosovo, 
which could result in an armed incursion by Serbian troops. The second variant predicted that a wave of up 
to one million refugees from Kosovo could flood into Macedonia and destabilise the country. For a critique 
of the various scenarios of internal and external threat to the integrity of Macedonia, see Troebst, Stefan, 
"An Ethnic War That Did Not Take Place: Macedonia, Its Minorities and Its Neighbours in the 1990s", In: 
War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence, David Turton, ed. (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 1997), pp. 77-103.  
14 See Troebst, "An Ethnic War that Did Not Take Place," p.91.  
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Macedonia where ethnic Albanians form a majority.15 This alarmist "domino theory" 
seems unlikely at the moment, if only because the pro-independence "Victory for 
Montenegro" coalition led by President Milo Djukanovic obtained too narrow a victory to 
move ahead with a referendum as planned (he lacks an overall majority and the electorate 
seems to be evenly split over the question of independence). In addition, to compare the 
situation of Montenegro with that of Western Macedonia would mean drawing a parallel 
between two radically different situations: Montenegro is a well-defined territorial entity, 
a constituent republic of the FRY, whose right to self-determination was recognised by 
the Badinter Commission.16 Montenegro can also refer to a tradition of independent 
statehood. None of these factors apply to the case of Western Macedonia. Furthermore, it 
would be extremely difficult to delimit a viable, independent ethnic Albanian part of 
Western Macedonia without also including significant groups of persons belonging to 
other ethnic communities. While many ethnic Macedonians believe that the NLA is 
fighting for a "Greater Albania",17 support for a "Greater Albania" is probably actually 
quite low amongst the ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia (and elsewhere); even 
those who do support this idea are not necessarily ready to take up arms to fight for it. 
Calls have also been made for federalisation of the country; this is opposed by the DPA. 
 
The international community was (surprisingly) quick and unified in condemning the 
actions of the NLA in February/March, calling for the resolution of ethnic Albanian 
claims through political dialogue, not violence. EU Foreign and Security Policy Advisor 
Javier Solana has made repeated trips to Skopje to encourage such a process. 
Unfortunately, talks between the main political parties failed to materialise for a long 
                                                    
15 The question of independence for Western Macedonia has not been directly raised by the NLA thus far. 
The NLA's official claims resemble those of the ethnic Albanian political parties, i.e. equal job 
opportunities in state institutions and administration for ethnic Albanians, recognitio a  an equal 
constituent people in the Macedonian Constitution, and that Albanian be made an official language. It has 
called for being included in talks with the Macedonian authorities over these issues.   
16 The "Badinter Commission" was a group of European jurists (headed by the president of the French 
Constitutional Court Robert Badinter) set up by the European Council to arbitrate disputes and establish 
criteria for the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. See the  
Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,
16 December 1991, Declaration on Yugoslavia, Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 
December 1991, and Interlocutory Decision (Opinions no. 8, 9 and 10), available in The European Journal 
of International Law 4:1 (1993) at: h tp://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1).  
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time and the opposition ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) even 
suspended all relations with the government in protest against the arrest of numerous 
suspected NLA fighters. DPA leader Arben Xhaferi condemned the outbreak of violence 
and affirmed that his party would remain in the governing coalition. He did, however, 
also criticise the arrests which he feared would trigger further violence, advocating a soft 
approach (amnesty and talks) towards the NLA instead.18  Renewed violence in 
April/May was justified by the NLA by the slow pace of political talks on the 
improvement of the rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. It was only because of an 
emergency trip to Skopje by Javier Solana on 6 May, who was joined the following day 
by NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, that the Macedonian government was 
discouraged from declaring a state of war. The international community feared that this 
would prompt the departure of the DPA from the governing coalition and further polarise 
the situation. Large-scale military action also risks producing human casualties and a 
refugee crisis, almost certainly leading to increased local support for the NLA.  The 
international community at the same time seems to have acknowledged its share of 
responsibility for the crisis, having failed to effectively seal the border between 
Macedonia and Kosovo.   
 
A positive side-effect of the violence has been the increase in various forms of 
international assistance to Macedonia. There has also been international aid targeted at 
the Albanian community, including $4.5 million for the new Southeast European 
University in Tetovo. Following the visit of Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski to 
Washington, D.C., on 1 May, the US announced an increase in technical-military and 
economic aid to Macedonia. A symbolic and significant step was taken on 9 April when a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed with Macedonia.19 How ver, 
one should question whether the international community is not sending out an 
                                                                                                                                              
17 "Greater Albania" refers to territories inhabited by ethnic Albanians, i.e. Albania itself, Kosovo, parts of 
southern Serbia (Presevo valley), as well as Western Macedonia (for references, see footnote 12).    
18 "Macedonia: Arrests and Accusations," RFE/RL Balkan Report 5:26, 10 April 2001 (at: 
http://www.rferl.org/balkan-report/2001/04/26-100401.html). 
19 The Stabilisation and Association Process was initiated by the EU during the NATO campaign in Kosovo 
as an upgrading of the EU's previous Regional Apprach to Southeastern Europe. The SAAs are at the 
center of this process, the first of which was signed with Macedonia. Further SAAs are being negotiated 
with Croatia, Albania and soon Bosnia. The status of the FRY is unclear.  
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ambiguous message to other crisis regions for one might deduce that the outbreak of 
violence rather than preventive measures brings quick gains. Furthermore, as the crisis 
has had very severe consequences on the economy, this aid might not result in significant 
improvements in a country where the unemployment rate is around 30%.
 
While on the one hand, the quick and unified response of the international community to 
the crisis should be acknowledged, it can also be criticised for conducting 'panic 
diplomacy' and for seeking to preserve the status quo in the region rather than working 
towards resolving uncertainty and coming up with a concerted policy on Southeast 
Europe. For example, the EU has strongly cautioned Montenegro against holding a 
referendum on independence at what it perceives to be a critical moment.20 The pr cess 
of negotiating a new r lationship between Montenegro and Serbia is likely to be very 
difficult, further contributing to a climate of uncertainty in the region. What should 
therefore be a greater source of concern to the international community is disagreement 
within Montenegro, between those in favour of independence and those against. It is the 
unresolved question of the future status of Kosovo and, arguably, uncertainty regarding 
the future relationship between Belgrade and Podgorica, which risk having a negative 
impact on iter-ethnic relations in Macedonia and regional stability in general.21  This is 
why the international community should focus on presenting constructive proposals and 
on encouraging political dialogue on unresolved issues rather than telling states what they 
should not be doing.  This is an important opportunity for the EU to show that it can deal 
with foreign policy problems on its own, without assistance from the US.  
 
From Bi-culturalism to Multiculturalism? 
Inter-ethnic relations have not been a priority of the Macedonian government, although 
its efforts to cooperate with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to 
resolve the question of higher-language education in Albanian should be recognised. The 
                                                    
20 "EU Warns Montenegro Against Independence," RFE/RL Newsline, 25 April 2001; see also RFE/RL 
Newsline, "End Note," 23 April 2001.  
21 See: The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, ICG Balkans Report no. 109 (Skopje/Brussels:  
International Crisis Group, 5 April 2001, at: http://www.crisisweb.org). See also After Milosevic: A 
Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, ICG Balkans Report no. 108 (Brussels: International Crisis 
Group,  26 April 2001, at: http://www.crisisweb.org). 
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MHC has repeatedly drawn attention to the ethnoc ntric orientation of education, 
deploring that this area has become an ethnic battleground rather than an integrative 
matter. There are many other problem areas which must be resolved, preferably at the 
local level, for example concerning the use of minority languages. Decentralisation and 
dialogue at the local level are the key to addressing issues affecting inter-ethni  relations. 
Talks at the level of the political elite are not sufficient, especially given that the general 
population's trust in its politicians has increasingly eroded, due to corruption scandals and 
their inability to deal with crisis situations. Divergences of positions should also be 
allowed for within each ethnic community, rather than expecting a homogenous stance. 
Two more importan  issues which need to be resolved if a significant improvement in 
inter-ethnic relations is to be achieved will be highlighted below.  
 
The unclear formulation in the preamble of the Constitution, which combines the ethnic 
and civic conceptions of the Mac donian state, does not help create a positive context for 
dialogue. However, to recognise ethnic Albanians as a second constituent people risks to 
further accentuate tensions by scoring a point for ethnic politics and causing the  
dissatisfaction of some of the other ethnic communities (Roma, Turks, Serbs and the 
Vlachs).22 Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski is clearly not too keen on revising the 
Constitution; rather, he prefers to talk about individual rights, emphasising that the 
priority at the moment is economic, social and other reform.  As it seems improbable that 
the issue of the preamble of the Constitution will be laid to rest, what should be discussed 
is a formulation clearly stating that the Republic of Macedonia is a state for all of its 
citizens, regardless of ethnic, religious or linguistic origin. The reality, however, is that it 
will take some time before such a civic society can de developed. In the meantime, the 
minority approach can not be abandoned.  
 
The upcoming population census (which was supposed to have been held from 15-30 
May 2001 but has been postponed to October due to the crisis) will hopefully settle 
                                                    
22 Ethnic Albanians are dissatisfied with the preamble of the Constitution which states that "Macedonia is 
established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent 
co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other 
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another sensitive issue: that of the size of the various ethnic communities. It is therefore 
crucial that it is carefully prepared and carried out, under the supervision of international 
observers, and that it is not boycotted by any segment of the population. The census 
should also be conducted, as far as possible, with the participation of members of the 
minority communities in the census commissions, and it should count all those who have 
chosen to make Macedonia their home.23 The two ethnic Albanian parties have insisted 
that census questionnaires be printed in the minority languages. This, too, is controversial 
for the Macedonian Constitutional Court ruled on 25 January 1995 to revoke Article 35 
of the previous census law which allowed for questionnaires to be filled out in the 
minority language, arguing that this amounted to granting minorities official use of their 
language nationwide and not only in self-government units (the latter right is 
recognised).24 According to the new law, census forms will be printed in the Macedonian 
language in Cyrillic, but the State Census Commission is willing to give each census-
taker a copy of the questionnaire in the language of the nationalities (minority languages). 
It is also envisaged to have an interpreter to help fill out the forms. The upcoming census 
has a particular significance for ethnic Albanians: they hope that official statistics w ll be 
adjusted to state that they constitute up to 35% of the total population of about 2 million, 
rather than 23% according to 1994 figures.25 Other minority communities, especially the 
Roma, should also be made aware of the importance of an accurate census.  
 
Conclusion 
The Macedonian state is being tested from all sides: by the NLA which is waging 
guerrilla warfare, by the ethnic Albanians who are presenting great demands, and by the 
international community which is exercising pressure on it to address ethnic Albanian 
                                                                                                                                              
nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia…" (Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia, promulgated on 6 January 1992) (at: http://www.soros.org.mk/mk/en/const.htm).  
23 The UNHCR and the Council of Europe have called for cutting down the residence requirement for  
Macedonian citizenship from 15 to 10 years in the citizenship law in order to regularis  the situation of 
refugees (from Kosovo, Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia principally).   
24 For more on the current census debate, see "A Lesson in Political Mathematics," AIM Skopje, 20 April 
2001 (at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/2102). 
25 Discrepancies are due to the difference between the total number of ethnic Albanians living in the 
country and those with legal residence. There is also a debate on how to count the ethnic Albanian diaspora.  
The  ethnic Albanian parties in Macedonia want all ethnic Albanians who have lived abroad for more than 
one year to be counted; the UN, however, recommends setting a one year cut-off point to minimise the risk 
of counting the same person twice. 
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grievances.  But the Macedonian population, too, is being tested on its ability to resist 
provocation to engage in acts of inter-eth ic hatred; it must therefore demonstrate that the 
claim to being a model of peaceful inter-eth ic relations is well deserved. At the time of 
writing, a state of war has been averted. Furthermore, on 14 May, after lengthy 
negotiations, a new  "government of national unity" faced its first day of work.  The idea  
to form a broad coalition was set forth in Marc 2001 as a means of addressing the crisis 
with the participation of all political parties with representation in Parliament. However, 
there were many issues to be resolved between the two main (ethnic) Macedonian parties, 
the VMRO-DPMNE and the opposition Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia 
(SDSM), especially over the issue of early elections and distribution of ministry seats. 
Negotiations with the PDP were also tough (the PDP was demanding a ceasefire against 
the NLA before joining the coalition but it was more probably weighing the losses in 
NLA-sympathiser votes that it might incur by joining the government). While the support 
of the ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia for the violent tactics of the NLA seems 
to be quite low still, all will depen on whether the politicians will manage to put 
personal interests aside and reach an agreement as to how to address their grievances. It 
would be dangerous on the part of the Macedonian government to underestimate the 
readiness of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to take up arms.   
 
What is also needed, in addition to high-level political dialogue, is a broad civic debate at 
the intermediate and grassroots level. Already, many initiatives have been launched to 
establish roundtables on inter-ethnic relations involving political leaders, minority 
representatives, experts, civil society, etc. In order to create the right conditions for 
genuine dialogue, what is needed is a common civic framework for resolving the question 
of inter-ethnic relations. The MHC calls for a citizen's approach as well as adherence to 
multiculturalism rather than bi-culturalism which would allow for identification with 
more than one ethnicity. The urgency of such a broad dialogue on legislative reform, 
decentralisation and other issues is evident for what is at stake is stability as well as long-
term prospects for majority-minority accommodation not only in Macedonia but also in 
the whole of Southeast Europe. It is unfortunate that violence was needed to place the 
issue of inter- thnic relations at the top of the Macedonian political agenda.  
